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Section 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 enshrines the right to assemble, 
peacefully and unarmed, and the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 enables the exercise 
of this right peacefully and with due regard to the rights of others. The recent student protests 
across South Africa have occasioned litigation seeking to interdict protest action, which the 
universities claim is unlawful. Overly broad interdicts, which interdict lawful protest action, violate the 
constitutional right to assembly and have a chilling effect on protests. In a decision of the High Court 
of South Africa, Eastern Cape Division, Grahamstown, a final interdict was granted interdicting two 
individuals from, among other things, disrupting lectures and tutorials at Rhodes University and from 
inciting such disruption. In this note, the constitutionality of interdicting non-violent disruptive protest 
is discussed and analysed, using Rhodes University v Student Representative Council of Rhodes 
University and Others (1937/2016) [2016] ZAECGHC 141.    




In recent years, student protests – related to 
#FeesMustFall and others – have become 
commonplace on university campuses across 
South Africa. These protests, while generally 
peaceful, have sometimes involved serious 
unlawful activity and acts of violence, including 
arson, intimidation and damage to property.1 
As a result, many universities have obtained 
interdicts to restrain unlawful protest action.2 
Although criminal charges may be brought 
against those who commit crimes in the 
course of a protest, interdicts are often seen as  
being more effective, because the application 
procedure for an interdict is far speedier. The 
Rhodes3 case began with student protests 
against gender-based violence at Rhodes 
University and the publication, on Facebook, of 
the ‘#RU Reference List’ (the List) that named 
certain students as rapists.4 Student protesters 
at Rhodes University engaged in a number 
of non-violent disruptive acts, ranging from 
blockading roads and access to the university 
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to interrupting lectures, along with more 
definitively unlawful acts such as intimidation 
and assault.5 The university responded by 
interdicting a range of protest activity, including 
the disruption of lectures and ‘academic 
progress’. Consequently, the Rhodes case 
presents a unique opportunity to consider what 
protection should be afforded to non-violent 
disruptive protest action that does not rise to 
the level of clearly unlawful activity.
Legal background
Although a number of rights are implicated in 
protest action, including the rights to freedom of 
assembly, expression and association as well as 
political rights, this discussion will largely focus 
on the right to freedom of assembly. Section 17 
of the Constitution6 affords everyone the right 
to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present 
petitions, provided they do so peacefully and 
unarmed. When interpreting section 17, the 
Constitutional Court has given the right broad 
and generous application to afford everyone 
a right to assemble or gather for any lawful 
purpose, provided they do so unarmed.7 
This right and protection is only lost if those 
gathering do not intend to be peaceful.8 
While violent protest is not protected under 
section 17, the Constitutional Court has 
nonetheless found that a protester should be 
afforded constitutional protection even if there 
is sporadic violence at the gathering, provided 
that the individual concerned remains peaceful.9 
This means that violent protesters may lose 
constitutional protection without impugning the 
protection afforded to peaceful protesters who 
are also present. This generous interpretation 
of the right to freedom of assembly extends 
the protection of section 17 to a wide range of 
protest action, arguably including non-violent 
disruptive protest. However, as with the other 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights, section 
17 can be justifiably limited in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution. It is important to note 
that while violent protesters do not impugn the 
constitutional protection afforded to others, 
violent protesters themselves lose protection 
and may be subject to prosecution if their 
actions rise to the level of criminal activity.
The enabling legislation for the right to freedom 
of assembly, the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act10 (RGA), regulates how assemblies and 
gatherings may take place. The RGA applies 
to demonstrations (defined as the assembly of 
fewer than 15 people) and gatherings (defined 
as the assembly of 15 or more people on a 
public road or in a public place). Consequently, 
the RGA often does not apply to protests that 
take place on university property. However, 
the RGA can still provide guidance about 
lawful protest action since it outlines what 
conduct is prohibited and permissible at 
gatherings.11 Specifically, the RGA prohibits 
possessing weapons, inciting violence, and 
attempting to compel people to join a gathering 
or demonstration; thereby delineating what 
constitutes ‘armed and non-peaceful’ protest.12 
While the RGA does not prohibit barring 
entrances to buildings or access to premises, 
it places an obligation upon marshals to take 
reasonable steps to prevent protesters from 
denying access.13 Notably, the RGA does not 
prohibit protesters from disrupting business and 
other activities. 
Beyond legislative restrictions, the right to 
protest is not absolute and must be exercised 
with ‘due regard for the rights of others’.14 
This was confirmed and developed in Hotz,15 
a case related to the #FeesMustFall protests 
and which involved non-violent disruptive and 
violent protest action. The University of Cape 
Town applied for an interdict when students, 
during a protest that has come to be known as 
‘Shackville’, erected a structure that blocked a 
university road and obstructed traffic, engaged 
in acts that damaged university property, and 
assaulted staff.16 The law provides that a party 
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The facts
In April 2016, the List, which named a number 
of past and present students who had allegedly 
sexually assaulted or raped other students, 
was published.23 The List quickly became a 
symbol of rape culture to students at Rhodes 
University, sparking a number of protests.24 
These protests culminated in a large group of 
students converging on student residences on 
17 April 2016, and kidnapping and assaulting 
some of the individuals identified in the List.25 
Following this, students barricaded entrances to 
the campus, comprising two public roads and 
a private road.26 The Student Representative 
Council of Rhodes University (SRC) called for 
an ‘academic shutdown’.27 This ‘shutdown’ 
was effected by protesters physically chaining 
doors as well as interrupting lectures and being 
disruptive in test venues and libraries.28 
On 29 April 2016 Rhodes University 
administration responded by obtaining an 
interim interdict that prevented students at the 
university from participating in, facilitating or 
encouraging unlawful activities on campus.29 
The interdict applied to three named 
individuals, Sian Ferguson, Yolanda Dyantyi and 
Simamkhele Heleni (the named students), and 
to the broad classes of ‘students and persons 
associating themselves with or engaging in 
unlawful activities’ on campus (emphasis 
added).30 This meant the interdict not only 
applied to specified people who were previously 
involved in the protests but could also be 
used against future protesters. The interdict 
prohibited a number of listed activities that 
the university considered ‘unlawful’, including 
hindering access to campus, disrupting lectures 
and tutorials, and damaging the university’s 
property and reputation.31 The interdict also 
prevented protest action that would interfere 
with the academic progress of the university. 
The interim interdict thus prohibited both 
protest action that was clearly unlawful (causing 
may be granted a final interdict if they have a 
clear right that has been injured or a reasonable 
apprehension of such injury being committed 
and there is no other suitable alternative remedy 
available.17 Here, the university’s rights to, 
among others, ensure the safety of its staff 
and control access to its property had been 
infringed by the student protest.18 While the 
students conceded the unlawfulness of their 
actions, they argued that their conduct was 
justifiable and not wrongful.19 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal recognised the historical 
importance of ‘civil disobedience’ in combatting 
unjust regimes, but did not decide whether 
protest akin to this would be justifiable and 
lawful.20 Consequently, the legal protection 
afforded to protest action that is not violent, but 
still disrupts or prevents normal activity, remains 
murky. This issue arose repeatedly during the 
#FeesMustFall student protests and, specifically, 
in the Rhodes case. 
Non-violent disruptive protest is not a new 
phenomenon, nor is it unique to the student 
protests. Disruptive protest tactics were used 
to resist the apartheid government, despite 
its attempts to ban and suppress any forms 
of protest.21 In a democratic South Africa 
the status of this form of disruptive protest 
is unclear, since protest is now afforded 
constitutional protection.22 The student protests, 
which were litigated through numerous 
interdicts, provide an opportunity to examine 
how the law treats disruptive protest action. 
Though some action during the student 
protests was clearly unlawful (such as damage 
to property, intimidation and violence), this note 
will focus on the non-violent disruptive protest 
activities that took place, such as interrupting 
lectures and tutorials, barricading university 
buildings, and otherwise hindering academic 
activities. These activities fall into a grey area 
that is not presumptively unlawful and the 
Rhodes case may be the first opportunity the 
Constitutional Court has to clarify the issue. 
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damage to property, assault and intimidation) 
and protest action that was merely disruptive 
(the disruption of lectures and tutorials), the legal 
status of which is less clear.    
The named students opposed the finalisation 
of the interdict. In addition, 37 academic staff 
members of Rhodes University applied to 
intervene and also opposed the finalisation of 
the interdict. Both groups chose to focus on the 
ambit of the interdict. 
Both the intervening staff and named students 
focused on the parts of the interdict that 
applied to activity that was not clearly unlawful, 
and challenged the constitutionality of the 
interdict in this regard.32 The named students 
argued that the interdict was overly broad and 
vague and, as a result, interdicted lawful and 
protected protest action. The intervening staff 
argued that the class of persons the interdict 
applied to was overly broad and had been used 
to threaten staff who encouraged students 
to disrupt, thus infringing the staff’s right to 
freedom of expression and academic freedom.33 
Specifically, Rhodes University threatened 
to prosecute a staff member for telling her 
students to ‘put up your hand and ask about 
rape culture, disrupt’.34 The case thus turned on 
whether the interdict had unjustifiably infringed 
the parties’ rights to freedom of expression, 
right to freedom of assembly and, in the case 
of lecturers, their academic freedom. It was 
further contended that the university’s failure to 
meaningfully engage with the protesters also 
rendered the interdict unconstitutional.35 
In addition, the named students disputed 
the allegations that they had engaged in or 
associated with unlawful activities. These 
students all confirmed that they had been 
involved in some protest action, but contended 
that this involvement was lawful. The named 
students did concede, however, that where 
protest action had amounted to criminal 
conduct, it should not be protected.36 
The judgment
Judge Lowe had to consider two issues when 
deciding the case: firstly, whether the conduct 
being interdicted was constitutionally protected, 
and, secondly, whether there was a valid basis 
for granting an interdict. 
In deciding whether the interdict should stand, 
the court considered whether the requirements 
for a final interdict had been met, namely that the 
university had a clear right that had been injured 
or was reasonably apprehended to be injured, 
and that there was no alternative 
remedy available.37 The court applied the 
precedent set in Hotz, which meant that the 
unlawfulness of the protest action and the 
likelihood of the protest action being repeated 
was also considered.38
The court found that the university did have 
certain rights that warranted the protection of an 
interdict, including its rights to control access to 
and prevent unlawful conduct on its property, as 
well as to ensure that staff are able to perform 
work.39 Though the students and staff suggested 
remedies which they considered to be suitable 
alternatives to an interdict, for instance criminal 
charges or disciplinary proceedings, the court 
found that none of the alternatives was a 
proper or effective alternative to an interdict.40 
Consequently, the court found the university had 
a clear right, and that an interdict was the only 
suitable remedy available.41 As a result, the case 
turned on the injury caused by the interdicted 
parties and the lawfulness of their actions. 
The court found that there had been an injury to 
the university’s rights in a general sense, where 
the protest action had involved unlawful and 
unprotected activities such as kidnapping.42 The 
court also held that section 17 did not protect 
protest action that interfered with the rights of 
other students, and found that such action could 
be interdicted.43 The determinative consideration 
was whether the party being interdicted 
had engaged in protest action that was not 
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protected. Since each party had engaged in 
different actions, the court had to consider 
each individually.
The Student Representative Council (SRC) 
had elected not to oppose the interdict. The 
court held that the SRC’s call for an ‘academic 
shutdown’ was protected under section 17, 
provided that it did not incite violent protest 
action.44 The interim interdict against the SRC 
was discharged.
It was alleged that the named students had 
participated in the protests and engaged in 
unlawful activity. None denied participating in the 
protests, but all denied involvement in unlawful 
activity. The court found that all the named 
students had associated with the unlawful 
activities of kidnapping, assault and inciting 
violence. The court further found that Ferguson 
and Dyantyi had participated in the disruption of 
lectures at the university.45 Ferguson had 
posted on Facebook, calling for a certain 
lecture to be disrupted peacefully, while Dyantyi 
was part of a group of students that disrupted 
a lecture and prevented its continuation.46 
Ferguson and Dyantyi argued that disruption of 
lectures is not unlawful, but rather falls within 
constitutional protection, provided that it is 
peaceful.47 The court assumed that disruption 
of lectures was unlawful and held that disrupting 
lectures was not a form of constitutionally 
protected protest action.48 The court confirmed 
the interdict against the students but reduced 
the scope significantly.
Including the classes of students and others 
‘engaging in unlawful protest activity’ under 
the interim interdict was arguably the most 
tenuous part of the order, and the reason 
why staff members sought to intervene in 
the application.49 The court found that the 
interdict applied to individuals who had not 
acted unlawfully or associated themselves with 
unlawfulness, and thus were still entitled to 
constitutional protection.50 The court therefore 
held that the interdict infringed their rights and 
that the classes referred to were vaguely and 
broadly defined.51 The interdict against both 
classes was discharged. 
The court ultimately decided to reduce the 
scope of the interdict quite drastically and 
restricted its application to only Ferguson, 
Dyantyi and Heleni.52 All three students were 
interdicted from clearly unlawful activities such 
as kidnapping, assault and inciting violence. 
Heleni was also interdicted from interfering 
with access to the university. Most notably, 
Ferguson and Dyantyi were also interdicted from 
disrupting, and inciting disruption of, lectures 
and tutorials at Rhodes University. 
Appeal to the Constitutional Court
Following the high court decision, the named 
students unsuccessfully applied to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to appeal.53 
The students have since approached the 
Constitutional Court for leave to appeal the 
final interdict.54 
In their application, the named students raised 
important issues relating to whether Lowe’s 
interpretation of the law and his findings might 
infringe the right to protest. They contend that 
they should not have been interdicted from 
specific unlawful acts, including kidnapping 
and assault.55 The high court had granted the 
interdict on the basis that the students had 
associated themselves with unlawful conduct 
during the protests. However, the students 
contend no connection was established 
between themselves and these unlawful acts, 
and that their mere participation in the protests 
(or even taking a leadership role in the protests) 
does not imply association with any unlawful 
acts committed by others during the protests.56
Ferguson and Dyantyi also contend that they 
should not have been interdicted from disrupting 
lectures and tutorials because such conduct is 
not unlawful.57 Instead, they argue, temporary 
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disruption of a class to express a grievance 
or view is an exercise of their constitutionally 
protected rights to freedom of assembly and 
expression.58 They submit that disruption of a 
class is not unlawful unless it completely 
breaks up the class.59 The high court had 
assumed that disruption of lectures and tutorials 
was unlawful without meaningfully considering 
the issue.60 
At time of writing, the Constitutional Court has 
not yet heard the application.   
Comment 
The high court decision is something of a mixed 
bag, which leaves important issues ripe for 
consideration by the Constitutional Court, if the 
appeal is heard. Before discussing these issues, 
however, it is worth noting the significance of 
the Rhodes judgment as precedent for future 
protest cases, particularly those concerning 
academic environments and participants.
Recognition of academic freedom
A noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the 
reliance that the intervening staff placed on 
their right to academic freedom in challenging 
the interim interdict. Academic freedom, at 
the core of which is the right of individuals 
to carry out research and teaching without 
interference, is protected as part of the right 
to freedom of expression in our Constitution.61 
This protection recognises our recent past 
under which academic freedom was severely 
restricted, and any academic thought, speech 
and writing that criticised the unjust system 
of apartheid was supressed.62 Academic 
freedom acts as a defence against forced 
conformity, ensuring that we achieve the kind 
of open and democratic society envisioned by 
our Constitution.63 It benefits not merely the 
individuals involved in academia but also our 
society as a whole, since academia plays an 
important role in our society through knowledge 
creation and dissemination.64  
Despite its importance, the right to academic 
freedom has not yet been given much content by 
our courts. This case marks the first time that the 
right to academic freedom has been considered 
within the context of interdicts against protest 
action. The interim interdict not only limited the 
rights of students to freedom of assembly and 
expression but also limited the right of academic 
staff to academic freedom, in that the university 
had used the interdict to threaten a lecturer who 
sought to engage students on rape culture with 
contempt proceedings.65 
In its decision, the court demonstrated an 
understanding of the importance of 
academic freedom:
[A]cademia has in the history of our 
country, first pre- and then post-1994, a 
proud tradition of academic excellence 
and academic freedom, and have, at 
least amongst the enlightened, always 
jealously guarded the entitlement to 
express their academic views in the best 
traditions thereof.66  
Although the court did not explicitly find that the 
interim interdict infringed academic freedom, it 
was highly critical of how the interdict had been 
used against a lecturer.67 The court refused to 
finalise the interim interdict against the class of 
‘others engaging in unlawful protest activity’, 
which included academic staff. 
Restrictions on interdicting classes
At a more general level, the Rhodes decision 
sets important parameters as to whom an 
interdict may apply to. The overly broad and 
vaguely defined classes named in the interdict 
left room for potential abuse and resulted in 
a chilling effect on protest action throughout 
Rhodes University.68 This chilling effect was not 
restricted to protests concerning the List, but 
ended up also impacting later protest action.69 
In framing the respondents in the interdict so 
broadly, Rhodes University relied, in part, on 
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a growing trend to grant interdicts against 
unnamed classes and groups of protesters.70 
This framing attempts to address the difficulty 
in identifying and naming all individuals who 
have engaged in unlawful protest, particularly 
when protests are protracted and diffuse across 
university campuses. Other universities have 
similarly relied on this difficulty to justify broad 
interim interdicts.71 
In Rhodes, however, Lowe clearly delineated the 
grounds on which an interdict may be granted 
against unnamed individuals. Previous cases 
had allowed interdicts to apply to unnamed 
individuals by interdicting a class, provided that 
the members of that class were ascertainable.72 
The decision in Rhodes limits the potential 
abuse of this allowance by excluding future 
conduct as a determining factor.73 This restricts 
the university’s ability to use the interdict as a 
pre-emptive measure to prevent and sanction 
future protesters through contempt of court 
proceedings.74 Instead, the interdict may only 
apply to individuals who belong in a class prior 
to the granting of the interdict.75 This means 
that, in the Rhodes case, the students or staff 
who disrupted lectures after the granting of the 
interdict would not violate it.
The lawfulness of non-violent 
disruptive protest
One of the judgment’s greatest shortcomings is 
that it assumes that certain forms of non-violent 
disruptive protest are unlawful and incompatible 
with peaceful protest, without meaningfully 
engaging with the constitutional protection 
afforded to such acts. While case law on violent 
protest action is plentiful and discussed at length 
in the Rhodes case, precedent around disruptive 
protest action is sparse. This is perhaps 
because, in previous cases, disruptive protest 
action has been accompanied by violence 
and the interdicts have applied to individuals 
who participated in or aligned themselves with 
violent protest.76 However, Rhodes was entirely 
unique in interdicting lawful – albeit disruptive – 
protest action and applying it to individuals who 
were not involved in violent protest action. By 
assuming that disrupting lectures and tutorials 
was unlawful, the court missed an opportunity 
to recognise the importance of non-violent 
disruptive protest action and develop the law to 
protect this action. 
Disruptive but non-violent protest action has a 
long and proud history in South Africa, dating 
back to peaceful resistance during apartheid.77 
These forms of resistance were often outlawed 
by the government in an attempt to stymie 
the anti-apartheid struggle.78 It is against 
this backdrop that the right to assemble and 
demonstrate was recognised and included 
in both the interim Constitution79 and the 
final Constitution.80 However, the right, in 
both iterations, only applied to peaceful and 
unarmed action. Fortunately, in interpreting it, 
the courts have given the wording a generous 
interpretation which, at a minimum, protects 
‘non-violent’ protest action.81 Beyond this, 
Garvas hints at a positive content of the right 
that protects protest action, even where there 
has been sporadic violence.82 Furthermore, in 
the RGA the legislature elected to permit certain 
acts of disruption, such as barricading streets, 
indicating a level of permissiveness towards 
non-violent disruptive protest. Arguably, the 
definition of peaceful protest under section 17 
is broad enough to include a range of legitimate 
protest action, including non-violent disruptive 
protest. The court in Rhodes seemed to 
acknowledge this when it stated:
M]ass protest continues to be an 
important form of political engagement 
and is an essential role player in any 
liberal democracy. Meaningful dialogue 
may well require the collective efforts of 
demonstrators, picketers and protesters. 
Crowd action albeit loud, noisy and 
disruptive is a direct expression of 
popular opinion.83
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However, despite this dicta, the court went on to 
refer to a call for ‘peaceful disruption’ of a lecture 
as oxymoronic and to assume that disrupting 
lectures and tutorials was unlawful.84 Although it 
was agreed by both sides that the disruption of 
lectures and tutorials was a non-violent protest 
action and the participants were unarmed, the 
court nonetheless classified it as ‘unlawful’ 
protest action and interdicted it. This finding and 
assumption of unlawfulness is inconsistent with 
the generous interpretation afforded the section 
17 right and its historical context. Furthermore, 
there does not appear to be any basis, in case 
law or legislation, that classifies such conduct 
as unlawful. When measured against section 17, 
the non-violent disruptive protest action in the 
Rhodes case was constitutionally protected and 
the infringement of this right ought to have been 
considered in the judgment. This is not to say 
that all disruptive protest action is permitted and 
cannot be subjected to an interdict, but merely 
that the court ought to take cognisance of the 
constitutional protection it is afforded. 
The question is then, how should the court have 
dealt with interdicting constitutionally protected 
protest action? At the high court level, Lowe 
interpreted Hotz to have developed the criteria 
for an interdict to include the constitutional 
protection.85 To do this, the court developed 
the criteria of ‘injury’ to the university’s rights 
and held that, because the students had 
engaged in violent protest action that was not 
constitutionally protected, they had injured 
the university’s rights.86 Unfortunately, framing 
the criteria in this manner does not provide 
a mechanism to deal with a situation where 
students might engage in protest action that is 
protected but also injures the university’s rights 
and may possibly justify the granting of an 
interdict. As a result, the approach adopted in 
Rhodes lacks the sophistication needed to deal 
with the involvement and possible limitation of 
constitutional rights in the context of interdicts.
The right to assembly is not absolute and can 
be limited under certain circumstances. In the 
context of interdicts, judges are empowered to 
develop the common law in a manner that limits 
the right to assembly, provided the limitation 
is in line with section 36 of the Constitution.87 
This enables the judge to strike an appropriate 
balance between the rights of the various 
parties. As shown above, an interdict that 
restrains individuals from disrupting lectures 
and tutorials clearly limits the right to freedom 
of assembly, the scope of which extends to 
disruptive protest. 
The court in Rhodes would have needed to 
carefully examine whether the limitation was in 
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution, 
which requires that any limitations placed on 
rights must be reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society.88 The degree of 
the limitation of the right must be proportional to 
the purpose sought by the limitation, as well as 
its importance and effect, while also considering 
whether there are less restrictive means to 
achieve the same purpose.89
The Constitutional Court has already stressed 
the importance of the right to assembly in 
Garvas.90 Freedom of assembly enables 
vulnerable and marginalised people to express 
their grievances and to protect and advance 
their rights.91 Disruptive protest is a particularly 
effective way to draw attention to shared 
grievances and exercise the right to freedom of 
assembly. Indeed, the effective exercise of the 
right to freedom of assembly necessitates some 
level of disruption to everyday life.92 To this end, 
Rhodes University has a constitutional obligation 
to tolerate protest on its campus and with it, 
tolerate some disruption of its operations and 
activities. An interdict that restrains individuals 
from any disruption in a lecture or tutorial would 
be exceedingly invasive of the right to freedom 
of assembly. The Constitutional Court has urged 
that the exercise of this right may not be limited 
‘without good reason’.93 
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In granting the interdict, the court sought to 
protect the legitimate interests of the university, 
particularly the common law rights of a 
property owner, but it did not give adequate 
consideration to the constitutional protection 
afforded to non-violent disruptive protest. 
Consequently, the court’s development of 
the common law, which appears to make 
any disruption unlawful and subject to be 
interdicted, cannot be justifiable under section 
36. In order to balance the competing rights, 
the court would have needed to adjust the 
relief it granted to the university to be the least 
restrictive formulation needed to protect the 
university’s interests. This could have been 
achieved through a narrower interdict that, for 
example, set out to curtail the level of disruption 
without restricting all disruption. By limiting 
the scope of the interdict to allow for some 
disruption, the interdict would have been less 
invasive of the right to freedom of assembly 
while effectively protecting the university’s 
interests, and thus a proportional and justifiable 
limitation of the right to freedom of assembly. 
In determining the scope of the interdict, the 
court would have had to consider the extent 
of disruption that the university is obliged to 
tolerate. A useful suggestion in this regard is 
made by the named students in their application 
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. Relying on DA v Speaker, National 
Assembly,94 the students suggest that the court 
distinguish between permanent disruption 
(which ‘incapacitates’ the lecture or tutorial) 
and temporary disruption (which allows for the 
expression of a grievance).95 This strikes a more 
appropriate balance between the rights of the 
parties, enabling the exercise of the right to 
freedom of assembly with due respect and care 
for the rights of others. 
Conclusion 
The Rhodes case and the #FeesMustFall 
protests more generally have raised important 
questions around the right to freedom of 
assembly and protected forms of protest 
action. While the Rhodes decision attempted 
to grapple with these issues, there remains 
much uncertainty. We wait to see whether the 
Constitutional Court will weigh in on the issue 
and bring clarity to the legal status of non-
violent disruptive protest.
Postscript
After this article was accepted, the 
Constitutional Court handed down a judgment 
on the appeal and we wish to highlight the 
salient points of the judgment in this postscript. 
Although the court granted the students 
leave to appeal, the court only upheld the 
appeal in respect of costs.96 Acting Justice 
Kollapen, writing for the majority, agreed with 
the named students that the case raised novel 
constitutional issues but dismissed their appeal 
on the grounds that the case did not ‘justify a 
ventilation and consideration of such issues’.97 
As a result, the Constitutional Court judgment 
did not deal with the substantive constitutional 
issues outlined in the named students’ appeal 
and leaves us without much-needed clarity on 
the legality of disruptive protest.
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